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between strength of corporate governance structure, and ownership structure on the extent of 
voluntary disclosures of Malaysian listed firms over that period. The average level of voluntary 
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extent of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with strength of corporate 
governance structure in both 2006 and 2009. Firms with concentrated ownership structure are 
associated with more extensive voluntary disclosures. These findings highlight the importance of an 
effective governance regime and concentrated ownership structure in reducing information asymmetry 
and agency costs and thereby enhancing the level of voluntary disclosures. These findings also have 
practical implications for policy-makers, analysts, auditors and regulators in Malaysia as well as East 
Asian countries. 
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In an increasingly volatile global market economy, 
investors require enhanced corporate disclosures 
that can assist them to make more informed 
decisions. Sound corporate governance and 
improved disclosure are important for the corporate 
world. The objectives of this study are to determine 
the variation in the extent of the voluntary 
disclosure practices in the annual reports of 
Malaysian listed firms between 2006 and 2009 that 
transcends major regulatory and governance 
changes in Malaysia and to assess the relation 
between strength of corporate governance structure, 
and ownership structure on the extent of voluntary 
disclosures in those years.  
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The current economic climate presents an 
enormous challenge for the corporate world to 
commit to sustainable business practices and 
position themselves as business leaders to their 
competitive advantage. The last decade has 
witnessed unprecedented global regulatory 
pressures for change, worldwide force of corporate 
governance reform and international convergence 
of accounting standards; which provide greater 
impetus for disclosure change. Sophisticated 
investors require disclosures that go beyond 
minimum statutory requirement to help them make 
more informed economic decisions. Non-financial 
information disclosure of a voluntary nature is a 
significant concern in developing countries with 
emerging markets such as Malaysia where the 
development and sustainability of capital market 
relies heavily on reducing the information gap 
between management and investors. Malaysia is 
one of the countries in the South East Asia region 
that has experienced rapid growth in market 
capitalization. The key ingredients in the value 
proposition of the significant growth in the 
Malaysian capital market are investor‟s confidence 
and trust in the reliability, quality and timely of 
information disclosed. Thus, the study on the 
assessment of the disclosure behaviour on this 
market is likely to be insightful to a range of 
stakeholders. 
This study focuses on two key periods of 2006 
and 2009. The 2006 year is chosen to represent the 
phase of adjustment to the corporate governance 
reforms since the release of the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2001 as well as 
the initiative to harmonise accounting standards 
with IFRS in 2006. It is expected that there is a 
greater focus on continuous improvement to 
corporate governance practices to improve 
accountability and transparency through the release 
of corporate information in annual reports. The 
MCCG was reviewed in 2007 to strengthen 
corporate governance practices, in particular with 
the view to enhance the quality and effectiveness of 
the board and audit committee. Thus, the 2009 year 
is selected to represent the further adjustment to 
corporate governance practices and the IFRS 
alignment before the full IFRS convergence in year 
2012. These two years selected are justifiable in 
view of the changing governance and accounting 
landscape in the midst of 2007 global economic 
crisis could possibly result in changing disclosure 
practices of Malaysian listed firms.  
The study contributes to the literature in 
several ways. First, it evaluates voluntary disclosure 
practices over two key time periods when Asian 
and global economic upheavals have triggered 
higher interest in corporate governance issues to 
improve transparency and accountability. This 
study provides an opportunity to clearly examine 
the pattern of voluntary disclosure practices of 
matched samples over two periods. Second, this 
study utilizes a novel and objective measure of 
strength of governance structure based on the best 
practice recommendations and principles released 
by the Malaysian Securities Commission as 
reflective of better or stronger governance. 
Currently, there is a lack of research that examines 
the association between the strength of governance 
structure and disclosure practices of firms. 
Reporting practices in Malaysia have evolved in 
line with changes in governance initiatives in 
Malaysia and also as a consequence of external 
shocks relating to economic crises and corporate 
collapses. Thus, it is important to gain an 
understanding of the key motivating factors and 
methods in the international context linking 
governance structure and management‟s disclosure 
incentives and practices. Finally, our findings 
should be of interest to economists, analysts, 
regulatory bodies, shareholders, creditors and 
accounting professionals. The findings will be of 
significance to Malaysian regulators and policy 
makers in assessing the disclosure practices and 
deliberating appropriate corporate governance 
requirement to improve corporate transparency. If 
these regulatory bodies and policy makers are well 
informed about actual practices at the corporate 
level, they will be better able to direct their 
policymaking and regulatory efforts. In view of the 
near similar governance structure, the findings will 
also be beneficial to the regulators and policy-
makers from East Asian countries. 
The empirical results of this study reveal that 
the strength of corporate governance structure is 
positively significantly associated with the extent of 
voluntary disclosures. Corporate governance 
structure plays an important role in influencing 
voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms.  
Regression results also show a significantly positive 
association between the concentrated ownership 
structure and extent of voluntary disclosure in both 
periods. The findings support the notion that 
dominant shareholders‟ assist in monitoring 
management thereby providing the impetus to 
communicate greater information in annual reports.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 reviews literature to develop 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research 
approach. The key findings of the study are 
highlighted in Section 4 then followed by 
concluding remarks in Section 5.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development 
 
Agency theory provides an ideal framework to 
assess firms‟ voluntary disclosure practices. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship 
as arising when there is a contract designed to 
motivate a rational agent to act on behalf of a 
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principal when the agent‟s interests would 
otherwise conflict with those of the principal. In the 
context of the firm, the agents such as board of 
directors and managers act on behalf of the 
principals such as shareholders and debtholders 
(Godfrey et al., 2006). The separation of company 
ownership and management provides management 
with the incentive to pursue self-serving utility-
maximising behaviour at the expense of 
shareholders interests. Management are self-
motivated and the goals of the shareholders and 
management conflict due to the non-alignment of 
their interests thus, giving rise to agency problems 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In the context of a firm, the crux of the matter 
is the possible information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders. In the agency 
relationship, managers who have better access to 
firm‟s accounting and financial information can use 
their discretion in financial reporting to ameliorate 
agency problem and enhance the value of 
shareholders investments. Thus, the underlying 
economic and welfare considerations determine the 
disclosure patterns within annual reports (Godfrey 
et al. 2006). Extant literature (Ostberg, 2006; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Welker, 1995) cites agency 
theory to explain managerial disclosure decision 
making. Management‟s disclosure decisions affect 
firms‟ credibility with investors and other 
stakeholders (Mercer, 2005). The voluntary 
disclosure is thus seen as an effort of management 
to eliminate disparities that may exist between what 
investors and stakeholders expect and what 
management can deliver.  
The adoption of corporate governance 
mechanisms has increased in recent years, and is 
largely due to changing expectations of capital 
markets; increased regulatory requirements; 
changes in accounting standards and the 
information needs of shareholders, capital market 
participants and an increasing array of other 
shareholders. Given the prominent attention to the 
role of corporate governance, there is a substantial 
body of evidence evaluating the influence of 
individual governance attributes on firms‟ 
disclosure policy. Prior studies have examined the 
association between corporate disclosure and 
specific governance attributes such as board 
composition, board committee formation and 
independence, CEO and board chairperson duality, 
audit committee (eg. Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; 
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Gul and Leung, 2004; 
Ho and Wong, 2001; Chen and Jaggi, 2000). 
Interestingly, these studies do not produce 
consistent evidence regarding the impact of these 
individual governance attributes on corporate 
disclosure.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Core (2001) 
highlight that a well-designed governance structure 
can help ensure an optimal firm‟s disclosure policy. 
More research is needed to investigate the relation 
of the overall corporate governance structure and 
corporate disclosures. However, the use of the 
index-based measure and its relation to corporate 
disclosure has started to gain researchers‟ attention 
in recent years (O‟ Sullivan et al., 2008; Beekes and 
Brown, 2006).  
O‟Sullivan et al. (2008) investigate the role 
played by a firm‟s corporate governance framework 
in the decision to voluntarily disclose forward-
looking information in annual reports of Australian 
companies. Their results show that firms disclosing 
forward-looking information typically experience a 
higher standard of corporate governance than non-
disclosing firms in year 2000, but not in year 2002. 
Their results also reveal that overall corporate 
governance is positively and significantly 
associated with the firm‟s decision to disclose 
forward-looking information in annual reports in 
year 2000 only.  
Beeks and Brown (2006) examine the link 
between the quality of a firm‟s corporate 
governance and the degree of informativeness of 
disclosed information. Their findings reveal that 
better-governed firms make more price-sensitive 
disclosure, have a larger analyst following, less 
biased analyst forecasts and more timely value-
relevant information. Overall, Beekes and Brown 
(2006) provide evidence that better-governed firms 
make more informative disclosure to the market. 
Byard et al. (2006) examine the association 
between corporate governance and the quality of 
information using a sample of analysts‟ forecasts. 
They find that better-governed firms have better 
quality information environment. Specifically, there 
is a statistically significant positive association 
between board independence and analysts‟ forecast 
accuracy, and significantly negatively associated 
with role duality. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) 
document that the likelihood of making 
management earnings forecast, a proxy for 
voluntary financial disclosure practices, is 
positively associated with stronger corporate 
governance structure in the form of more outside 
directors on the board, a lower level of managerial 
share ownership, a higher level of institutional 
ownership and a smaller audit committee. 
 The aforementioned literature suggests the 
adoption of corporate governance structure is an 
important determinant in influencing management 
to make greater disclosure of information on 
voluntary basis. Following Taylor et al. (2008), this 
study constructs a composite governance index 
based on various characteristics of corporate 
governance structure enlisted in the MCCG. This 
approach allows the evaluation of the influence of 
firm‟s governance structure as a whole on the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. The MCCG sets out 
principles and best practices on structures and 
processes that firms may use in operations towards 
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achieving the optimal governance framework. The 
MCCG is embedded with the transparency and 
disclosure initiatives; which suggests that firms 
with effective governance structure are likely to 
provide extensive information to stakeholders. The 
enactment of corporate governance principles 
should contribute to the reduction of information 
asymmetries between the board and suppliers of 
capital. Extant literature has shown that the 
presence of governance mechanisms enhances 
corporate disclosures (Bassett et al., 2007; Patelli 
and Prencipe, 2007; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a stronger 
governance structure will be associated with a 
greater extent of voluntary disclosures. As market 
mechanisms for promoting good corporate 
governance develop, the enhancement of this 
relationship is expected to develop over time. To 
formally test the influence of a firm‟s overall 
corporate governance score on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure, the following hypothesis is 
proposed:  
H1:  All else being equal, a firm’s corporate 
governance score is positively associated with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Ownership structure is a related aspect of 
corporate governance and arguably, has its own 
influencing effect upon voluntary disclosure. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) postulate that ownership 
structure has the potential of reducing information 
asymmetries and thereby, alleviating agency 
conflict between shareholders and managers. The 
degree of ownership structure measures the power 
of shareholders to influence managers which in turn 
determines the nature of the agency problem 
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). High dispersion of 
ownership occurs when the majority of 
shareholding is held by a large number of 
individual shareholders. Agency theory argues that 
firms will disclose more information to reduce 
agency costs and information asymmetry in a 
diffused ownership environment (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). A wide shareholder base is 
predicted to demand more information to be 
disclosed in the annual reports to reduce 
information asymmetry (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Thus, discretionary disclosure in annual reports is 
likely to be greater in widely held firms so that 
individual shareholders can effectively monitor that 
their economic interests are optimised and 
managers can signal that they act in the best 
interests of the owners.  
Greater disclosure in firms with diffuse 
ownership is empirically documented. For instance, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a significant 
positive relationship between voluntary disclosure 
of Malaysian firms and ownership diffusion based 
on the proportion of shares held by top ten 
shareholders. Using outside equity as a proxy for 
diffusion in Hong Kong firms, Chau and Gray 
(2002) reveal that the level of information 
disclosure is positively associated with wider 
ownership. The results of these studies of voluntary 
disclosure behaviour provide support for the agency 
theory argument that there is a positive association 
between wider ownership and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
On the other hand, the individual shareholders 
in a diffused ownership structure may lack 
monitoring capacity due to the low ownership stake 
of individual shareholders who may not be a 
formidable force to influence firm‟s disclosure 
choice (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990). In this 
instance, managers may voluntarily disclose less 
information in the annual reports. This line of 
argument is empirically supported by Barako et al. 
(2006) who report a significant negative 
relationship between ownership diffusion and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in Kenya, implying a 
lack of monitoring capacity due to low ownership 
stake of individual shareholders.   
Notwithstanding the contrary empirical 
findings, the effect of ownership dispersion on the 
extent of voluntary disclosure lacks conclusive 
evidence. For instance, Alsaeed (2005) examines 
the effect of ownership dispersion on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure by a sample of non-financial 
Saudi firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange. 
His study could not find supportive evidence on the 
association between ownership dispersion and 
voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Eng and Mak 
(2003) use blockholder ownership, defined as the 
proportion of shares held by substantial 
shareholders with shareholdings of 5% and more, as 
a proxy measure of ownership diffusion. They 
document that the level of disclosure is not 
significantly related to ownership diffusion (low 
blockholder ownership). The above previous 
studies did not support the claim that more 
monitoring via greater disclosure is required when 
ownership is diffused.  
When ownership is concentrated, the majority 
of ownership is controlled by a small number of 
large, dominant shareholders who could play an 
important role in monitoring management. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) argue that large (outside) 
ownership can help reduce agency conflicts due to 
their dominant power and incentive to prevent 
expropriation by insiders. In this regard, the 
dominant shareholders play a monitoring role and 
can be expected to put more pressure on 
management to disclose additional information.  
Empirically, Haji (2013) and Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) find no significant association 
between the ownership concentration and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. 
On the other hand, Hossain et al. (1994) reveal that 
ownership concentration is statistically negatively 
related to the level of information voluntarily 
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disclosed by Malaysian listed firms. In contrast, 
Birt et al. (2006) report that Australian firms having 
high level of shares owned by top 20 shareholders 
are more likely to disclose voluntary segment 
information. They provide the rationale that 
ownership concentration in the hands of large 
shareholders has the ability to mitigate the agency 
problems inherent in a firm by influencing the 
voluntary disclosures made by the firm.  
The aforementioned literature on the influence 
of the degree of dispersion of ownership on the 
extent of voluntary disclosure does not reach a clear 
or consistent finding. The mixed empirical findings 
of ownership structure as a governance mechanism 
could be the result of the variations in firms‟ 
ownership structure internationally. These 
differences clearly demonstrate the importance of 
considering the effect of ownership structure as 
governance mechanism in influencing a firm‟s 
corporate disclosure practices. 
The rapid growth of Malaysia‟s economy has 
not diluted the concentrated ownership structure in 
Malaysian firms. Zhuang et al. (2001) report that 
the largest shareholder still possesses an average 
30.3% of outstanding shares among all listed firms 
in Malaysia in 1998, with top five shareholders 
owning 58.8%. Further, both Abdul Samad (2004) 
and World Bank (1999) measure ownership 
concentration in terms of shareholdings by the top 
five shareholders in Malaysia and document that, 
on average, the top five shareholders held about 
60% of total equity in the corporate sectors. These 
surveys also document that the predominant 
shareholdings are held by family shareholders. This 
suggests that ownership and control of corporations 
in Malaysia typify the insider-dominated mould 
with concentrated shareholdings, a feature that is 
believed to have impaired the effectiveness of 
existing governance mechanisms in the corporate 
sector. Given the high insider ownership 
concentration that characterised the Malaysian 
firms and the proposition advanced in agency 
theory, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
H2: All else being equal, a firm’s 
concentrated ownership structure is negatively 
associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
3.  Research Methodology 
 
The annual reports of firms for years 2006 and 
2009 are sourced from Bursa Malaysia. The criteria 
of selection of sample companies are: (i) the 
availability of annual reports of companies for all 
two periods, (ii) companies selected in 2006 must 
remain listed on the stock exchange for 2009, and 
(iii) all banks, unit trust, insurance and finance 
companies will be excluded from the study due to 
different and stringent regulatory requirements.  
This study uses a self-constructed list of 75 
items of information of discretionary nature to 
derive a voluntary disclosure index, the proxy 
measure for the dependent variable. The list is 
developed based on the past disclosure studies 
conducted in developing countries (eg. Hossain et 
al., 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 
2006; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). This list is 
subject to screening by a Chartered Accountant 
from a Big Four firm to ascertain the items 
remained voluntary over the two years period. The 
voluntary disclosure instrument examines 
communication made in relation to four major 
categories of information namely, (i) corporate and 
strategy; (ii) financial and capital market data; (iii) 
forward-looking; and (iv) corporate social 
responsibility. Although there is a certain degree of 
subjectivity in constructing a disclosure index, it 
has proved to be a valuable research tool in the 
areas of disclosure research (Beattie et al., 2004).  
The complete annual report is scrutinized 
against the disclosure checklist. An item scores 1 if 
disclosed and 0 if it is not, subject to the 
applicability of the item concerned. The voluntary 
disclosure score for each company is additive and 
unweighted. The unweighted scoring approach 
assumes that each item of disclosure is equally 
important (Gray et al., 1995). Cooke (1989a, p.182) 
considers that unweighted indices are an 
appropriate research instrument in disclosure 
studies when the focus of the research is “directed 
at all users of corporate annual reports rather than 
the information needs of any specific user group.” 
On the other hand, the weighted approach 
incorporates the subjectivity of assigning weights 
when users‟ preferences are unknown and likely to 
assign different weights to similar items (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987). A screening process is applied 
to all selected companies‟ annual reports to ensure 
that judgment of relevance is not biased and not 
penalizing companies for not disclosing an item 
that is irrelevant. The disclosure instrument is 
scored and completed by one researcher to ensure 
consistency of scoring. A firm‟s voluntary 
disclosure index (VDI) is defined as the ratio of 
actual disclosures to the maximum possible score.   
In relation to the measurement of corporate 
governance variable, the principles and best 
practices of the MCCG and the Chapter 15 of Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirement provide authoritative 
and objective sources for selection of corporate 
governance attributes. The focus is on the included 
governance attributes that can be operational and 
have been deemed in the literature to be relevant. 
This gives rise to thirteen attributes (as listed in 
Table 5) selected for the construction of a measure 
of the corporate governance structure of a firm.  
Each of the attributes of corporate governance 
is measured as a dichotomous variable. A value of 1 
is assigned for each corporate governance attribute 
that is presumed to reinforce the voluntary 
disclosure practice of a firm, and 0 otherwise. A 
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firm receives a score ranging from 0 to 13 
depending on the number of attributes satisfied. 
This approach is deemed to be appropriate in view 
of the voluntary compliance with best practices of 
the MCCG. Firms in each period had the 
„opportunity‟ to incorporate any or all of these 
attributes. Given this premise, the corporate 
governance score are not adjusted as „not-
applicable” items. This approach is consistent with 
Taylor et al. (2008). The strength of a firm‟s 
corporate governance structure is captured by 
creating a composite proxy measure, defined as 
corporate governance score (CGS). The CGS, 
measured as a percentage, is treated as a continuous 
variable.  
Ownership structure variable is proxied by 
ownership concentration measured as the top five 
shareholders. This study includes firm-specific 
variables such as firm size, leverage, profitability, 
board size and audit firm size as control variables in 
the statistical analysis. The firms‟ annual reports 
form the basis of sourcing for the data. Table 1 
summarises the operationalisation and measurement 
of the independent and control variables. 
 




Corporate governance structure (CGS) 
 
Ownership concentration (OCON) 
 
the composite measurement of thirteen corporate 
governance attributes  
Proportion of shares held by top five shareholders 
Control variables: 
Firm size (FSIZE) 
Profitability (PROF) 
Leverage (LEV) 
Board size (BSIZE) 
Audit firm size (AUDIT) 
 
Natural log of total assets 
Net profit divided by Shareholders‟ Equity 
Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Number of directors on the board 
1 if firms are audited by Big Four, and 0 otherwise 
 
To test whether there are significant differences 
in the extent of voluntary disclosures, the parametric 
paired sample t-test is conducted. The use of same 
sample companies over the two periods facilitates 
the conduct of paired t-test. To assess the effect of 
each variable on the voluntary disclosure, a normal 
ordinary least square regression is conducted for 
each period. The regression model is defined as: 
 
VDIjt = β0 + β1CGSjt + β2OCONjt + β3FSIZEjt + 
β4PROFjt + β5LEVjt + β6BSIZEjt + β7AUDITjt εjt 
 
where   
VDIjt=firm‟s voluntary disclosure scores   
β=estimated coefficient for each item or category; 
CGSjt = corporate governance composite score for 
firm j in year t 
 OCONjt=ownership concentration for firm j in year t 
 FSIZEjt= firm size for firm j in year t; 
 PROFjt= Profitability for firm j in year t;  
LEVjt= Leverage for firm j in year t; 
BSIZEjt= Board Size for firm j in year t; 
AUDITjt= Audit firm size for firm j in year t; 
εjt  = error term 
 
4. Results   
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of firms‟ 
voluntary disclosures index score (VDI). Malaysian 
firms have an average VDI of 31.7%, with minimum 
and maximum scores of 8.0% and 74.7% 
respectively in 2006. The average VDI in 2009 is 
35.2% while the lowest and highest disclosure 
scores are virtually the same as in 2009. The extent 
of voluntary disclosure increases slightly between 
2006 and 2009.  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Firms‟ VDI 
 
 2006 2009 
Mean 31.679 35.160 
Standard Deviation 15.798 17.504 
Minimum 8.000 7.040 
Maximum 74.680 74.670 
Kurtosis -0.380 -0.448 
Skewness 0.575 0.108 
 
Paired t-test is performed to examine the 
statistical significance of differences between the 
means of the VDI over the two periods. Table 3 
shows there is a statistically significant (at the 1% 
level) increase in the mean VDI for sample firms.  
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Table 3. Paired Sample T-Test of VDI 
  
 2006-2009 
Mean of paired differences (%) 3.481 
% change VDI (VDIt-VDIt-1) 10.988 
Correlation 0.704* 
t-Stat 2.365 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001 
t Critical one-tail 1.660 
Legend: VDI = Voluntary Disclosure Index Score. Paired sample t-test result for mean VDI for sample firms is 
performed by comparing 2006 and 2009. The percentage change in mean VDI (VDIt-VDIt-1) between the two years is 
shown. The correlation between paired samples is significant at the 1% level. The one-tailed significance is reported because 
of the directional nature of the study. There is a statistically significant increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure over the 
periods 2006-2009.  
 
Table 4 shows the trend of disclosures of the 
four major categories of information. Malaysian 
listed firms tend to disclose more corporate and 
strategy information (CSI) in both years. The 
average CSI disclosure is 42.2% in 2006 although it 
dipped to 38.9% in 2009. Business strategy 
information is a complex but increasingly important 
subject in the face of globalization and liberalisation. 
Strategy impacts many aspects of a firm and 
ultimately impact on a firm‟s performance. Thus, 
strategy information becomes the fabric of a firm‟s 
disclosure in the annual reports. Information 
pertaining to corporate social responsibility (CSRI) 
is least communicated by Malaysian firms in 2006 
(21.1%). However, the extent of CSRI disclosure 
increased to 35.9% (an increase by 70%) in 2009. 
Malaysian firms tend to disclose the same amount of 
financial and capital market data information 
(FCMI) and forward-looking information (FLI) over 
the two periods.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of VDI by Sub-Categories 
  











Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 78.570 84.210 72.730 82.610 
Standard Deviation 19.938 18.437 14.559 23.017 
2009     
Mean 38.884 30.969 29.278 35.975 
Minimum 3.770 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 80.770 84.620 72.730 82.610 
Standard Deviation 21.344 19.730 17.797 21.980 
Legend: The descriptive statistics are expressed in percentage. VDI is categorised into four categories of discretionary 
information. These are: CSI = corporate and strategy information; FCMI = financial and capital market data information; 
FLI = forward-looking information; and SRI = corporate social responsibility information.  
 
Further insight into firms‟ implementation of 
individual corporate governance mechanisms is 
revealed in Table 5. There is a notable decrease in 
firms adopting CG1 from 62% to 53%, a decrease 
by 14.5%, reflecting the situation that Malaysian 
firms opt for role duality in latter year. On the other 
hand, the adoption of the corporate governance 
attributes increased between 2006 and 2009 are seen 
in CG6 (increased by 42%), CG9 (26.5%), CG10 
(27.3%) and CG12 (28.2%). Generally, Malaysian 
firms have increasingly become more aware of the 
adoption of recommended corporate governance 
attributes particularly the requirements of board sub-
committees (audit committee, remuneration 
committee and nomination committees).  
 
Table 6 reveals that the mean corporate 
governance score (CGS) is 69.0% in 2006. The 
lowest CGS is 38.5% while the highest CGS 
recorded is 92.3%. The mean CGS increased slightly 
to 72.9% in 2009 with the lowest CGS remains 
unchanged and the highest CGS attained is 100.0%. 
The average ownership shareholdings in 2006 is 
57.4%, which reflects the fact that Malaysian sample 
firms have a high ownership concentration with the 
majority of shareholdings held by the top five 
shareholders. There is a wide variation in ownership 
structure which ranges from 22.1% to 85.1%. The 
ownership structure remains to be highly 
concentrated in 2009 as reflected by the average 
shareholdings of 59.0%. The ownership stake by the 
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Table 5. Proportion of Firms Incorporating the Attributes of Corporate Governance 
   
  Attributes 
2006 2009 Change 
CG1 Chairman who is independent of Chief Executive Officer 62% 53% -14.5% 
CG2 
Independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board 
membership 
71% 70% -1.0% 
CG3 Board has defined policy of management responsibilities of the board and CEO 54% 54% - 
CG4 Audit committee chaired by independent non-executive directors 77% 75% -3.0% 
CG5 
Audit committee comprises at least three directors, majority of whom are 
independent 
74% 72% -3.0% 
CG6 
At least two members of audit committee have accounting or related financial 
management expertise 
36% 51% 42.0% 
CG7 Remuneration committee chaired by independent non-executive director 51% 50% -2.0% 
CG8 Remuneration committee consists wholly of non-executive directors 40% 38% -5.0% 
CG9 
Structured remuneration policy in place, where remuneration to directors is 
contingent of performance 
34% 43% 26.5% 
CG10 
Disclosure requirement in the annual report of the details of remuneration to each 
director 
11% 14% 27.3% 
CG11 
Nomination committee consists exclusively of non-executive directors, a 
majority of whom are independent 
67% 66% -1.5% 
CG12 
Does nomination committee adopt a formal procedure for appointments to the 
board? 
39% 50% 28.2% 
CG13 
Maintain sound system of internal control - financial, operational, compliance 
and risk management - to safeguard shareholders' investment and company assets 
75% 75% - 
 




CGS OCON CGS OCON 
Mean 69.031 57.38 72.929 59.014 
Standard Deviation 12.539 14.313 15.366 16.483 
Minimum 38.460 22.100 38.460 16.540 
Maximum 92.310 85.080 100.000 87.970 
Kurtosis -0.100 -0.267 -0.259 -0.138 
Skewness -0.045 -0.055 -0.089 -0.145 
Pearson Product-moment correlation 
coefficients for the continuous explanatory variables 
as well as the dependent variable for both periods 
are shown in Table 7. There is a positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.05) correlation between 
CGS and VDI in 2006 and 2009. Similarly, 
correlation between OCON and VDI is positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.01) in these two 
periods. For control variables, only FSIZE, PROF 
and BSIZE are positively and statistically 
significantly correlated with VDI in 2006 and 2009. 
Correlation coefficients among the continuous 
explanatory variables are below 0.7, which is below 
the benchmark level of 0.8 as indicated in Judge et 
al. (1980). Thus, multicollinearity is not a concern in 
this study.  
 
Table 7. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
2006 VDI CGS OCON FSIZE LEV PROF BSIZE 
VDI 1.000       
CGS 0.242** 1.000      
OCON 0.221** 0.212** 1.000     
FSIZE 0.569* -0.096 -0.039 1.000    
LEV 0.177 -0.228** -0.245** 0.336* 1.000   
PROF 0.198** 0.016 0.071 0.044 -0.115 1.000  
BSIZE 0.224** 0.015 0.123 0.289* -0.013 0.004 1.000 
2009        
VDI 1.000       
CGS 0.254** 1.000      
OCON 0.292* 0.154 1.000     
FSIZE 0.650* 0.083 0.107 1.000    
LEV 0.090 -0.250** -0.053 0.169 1.000   
PROF 0.308* 0.125 0.086 0.112 -0.232** 1.000  
BSIZE 0.306* 0.135 0.002 0.357* -0.049 0.112 1.000 
Legend: Pearson correlation matrix shows the correlation coefficients for all the continuous explanatory variables and 
the dependent variable. * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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OLS regression results are presented in Table 
8. The F-values (9.297 in 2006 and 9.482 in 2009) of 
the model is significant at the 0.001 level for both 
periods. The explanatory power of the model as 
indicated by the values of adjusted R-squared are 
43.3% and 52.7% in 2006 and 2009 respectively. 
Both of these values suggest that the model explains 
a substantial percentage of the variation in the level 
of corporate disclosure. 
 
Table 8. Regression Analysis of Determinants of Voluntary Disclosures 
   
  2006 2009 
Adjusted R² 0.433 0.527 
Durbin-Watson 1.986 2.187 
F statistic 9.297 9.482 
Significance 0.000* 0.000* 
 
Predicted 
sign Coeff. t Stat P-value 
 
VIF 
Coeff. t Stat P-value VIF 
Intercept  -58.243 -5.814 0.000*  -69.076 -3.897 0.000*  
CGS + 0.271 2.258 0.001* 1.157 0.394 3.901 0.000* 1.340 
OCON - 0.225 2.198 0.015** 1.124 0.293 2.769 0.020** 1.068 
FSIZE + 14.717 5.543 0.000* 1.319 12.872 4.828 0.000* 1.657 
LEV + 8.204 1.213 0.114 1.307 5.176 1.015 0.152 1.216 
PROF + 13.082 1.983 0.025** 1.053 6.215 1.846 0.033# 1.230 
BSIZE +/- 0.344 0.445 0.324 1.124 0.628 0.801 0.213 1.192 
AUDIT + -1.338 -0.389 0.349 1.237 2.550 0.707 0.241 1.237 
Legend: The table shows the results of regression for all sample firms against the independent and control variables. 
Associations *, **, # are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. One-tailed probabilities are used 
for the tests. The table reveals a positive and statistically highly significant association between sample firms’ VDI and CGS 
in 2006 and 2009, which is consistent with the predictions as hypothesized in H1. OCON is positively and significantly 
associated with VDI thus, H2 is not supported by such result. 
 
The OLS regression coefficients for CGS 
(2006: 0.271 and 2009: 0.394) are positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.01), suggesting that the 
enhanced corporate governance structure is 
associated with greater extent of voluntary 
disclosure for both periods.  The result is consistent 
with the predictions of a positive association 
between voluntary disclosure and the strength of 
corporate governance structure of all sample firms. 
Thus, H1 is supported in both periods. This result is 
similar to that of Beeks and Brown (2006), who 
reported a positive and significant association 
between corporate governance structure and 
information disclosure by Australian listed firms.  
Although a significant predictor, the result for 
ownership concentration is not in the direction 
predicted and thus, H2 is not supported. There is a 
consistently positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.05) association between voluntary disclosure 
and ownership concentration in 2006 and 2009. The 
results suggest that the higher the proportion owned 
by the top five shareholders, the higher the 
disclosure. This positive relationship is consistent 
with the results of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and 
Birt et al. (2006), suggesting that firms with 
concentrated ownership in the hands of large 
shareholders implies greater monitoring capacity to 
influence the management to provide more 
disclosures of voluntary type. 
The control variables that are included in this 
study are firm size, leverage, profitability, board size 
and audit firm size. Firm size is a very important 
corporate attribute associated with voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports. Table 8 reports that 
firm size is positively and statistically significantly 
(p<0.01) associated with voluntary disclosure in 
2006 and 2009. Similarly, a company‟s profitability 
level is found to be positive and statistically 
significantly (p<0.05) associated with voluntary 
disclosure in 2006 although it shows marginal 
statistical significance (p<0.10) in 2009. Hence, 
companies that are large in size and are profitable 
voluntarily provide more information in annual 
reports. Leverage, board size and audit firm size 
lacks statistical significance to show their impact on 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in our multivariate 
analysis in both periods.  
 
4.1 Tests on Robustness of the Model 
 
A problem encountered in disclosure studies is that 
disclosure indexes are an empirical proxy for the 
underlying theoretical construct (Beattie et al., 
2004). Cooke (1998) suggests multiple approaches 
are helpful to ensure the empirical results are robust 
across methods. The first approach used as a 
robustness measure is the rank regression analysis. 
The rank regression model is estimated with rank 
transformation of the VDI of the sample companies 
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and four corporate attributes measured on a 
continuous scale (i.e., corporate governance 
structure, ownership concentration, firm size, 
leverage and profitability). The OLS regression test 
is run on these ranked values plus the auditor type 
variable measured on categorical scale. The second 
approach involves transforming actual observations 
into normal scores using Van der Waerden‟s 
approach (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002, Cooke, 
1998). The VDI and continuous independent 
variables are transformed into normal scores. This 
approach offers an advantage whereby a normally 
distributed dependent variable implies that the errors 
are also normally distributed by the assumptions of 
OLS. 
Although not reported in this paper, the results 
of both approaches for both periods support the main 
findings about the significant influence of the 
strength of corporate governance structure and 
concentrated ownership structure on voluntary 
disclosure practices. The control variables found to 
have a significant relationship with disclosures are 
firm size and profitability.  
The multivariate analysis undertaken assumes 
the exogenous determination of both corporate 
governance and ownership structure variables. 
Concern arises of the possibility of the endogenous 
determination of corporate governance and 
ownership structure. A potential correlated omitted 
variable problem may occur where there are factors 
that may potentially affect corporate governance and 
ownership structure, and that may affect voluntary 
disclosure of information simultaneously 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). The endogeneity 
will adversely bias the OLS model used in this study 
thus, it would be difficult to interpret the association 
between corporate governance and ownership 
structure and voluntary disclosure. Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) recommend the examination of the 
association between changes in level of governance 
as a way to address potential endogeneity. This 
approach is appropriate since there is less likely to 
be a corresponding change in any potential omitted 
variable that is correlated with both the dependent 
and independent variables. Hence, the multiple 
regression analysis is conducted to ascertain the 
association between the change in voluntary 
disclosure and the change in the independent and 
control variables between the two periods. The 
results (not shown for brevity) indicate that there is 
no significant association between the change in 
VDI and the change in CGS and the change in 
OCON. This change analysis lessens any possible 
concern of the endogeneity in the determination of 




The study examines the association between 
voluntary disclosure and corporate governance 
structure and ownership structure. The extent of 
voluntary disclosure is investigated and compared 
over two periods when there was a revision to the 
code of corporate governance and the onset of global 
economic crisis. These changes are expected to have 
an influence on the corporate disclosure practices. 
The empirical results of this study provide credence 
to previous research findings as well as valuable 
insights regarding the extent of voluntary 
information disclosure among listed firms in this 
emerging country – Malaysia.  
The results show that the extent of voluntary 
disclosures is, on average, low although there is a 
statistically significant increase over the two years 
covered in this study. The significant increase could 
be attributed to the companies‟ responses to the 
changes in the business environment as a result of 
the revised Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance, global economic crisis, mandatory 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure 
requirement and increasing awareness of CSR in the 
Malaysian environment. Subsequently, the results 
reveal the extent of CSR information disclosed by 
Malaysian listed firms increased over the two years. 
Forward looking and corporate strategy information 
disclosed have taken a dip while the disclosure on 
financial and capital market data information 
remains largely the same over the two periods.  
The extent of voluntary disclosures in the 
annual report is related to a company‟s corporate 
governance structure, ownership structure and firm 
characteristics. The results suggest that corporate 
governance structure is positively and statistically 
significant in determining the extent of voluntary 
disclosures in 2006 and 2009 periods. Ownership 
structure is statistically and positively associated 
with voluntary disclosure in both periods although it 
is in the opposite direction to our expectation, 
suggesting that firms with concentrated ownership 
structure could influence management to voluntarily 
disclose information. Firm-specific control variables 
remained significant are firm size and profitability. 
The findings offer both theoretical and 
practical implications. These results provide 
evidence that firms may voluntarily disclose more 
information in enhanced governance structure, and 
imply that when external regulatory bodies 
emphasize corporate governance, boards align their 
monitoring objectives accordingly. The strength of 
corporate governance structure would thus prove to 
be useful for monitoring board‟s activities and 
mitigating agency-principal conflict which could 
result in greater communication. The ownership 
structure as characterized by large, dominant 
shareholders play an important role in monitoring 
management and reducing agency conflicts. Thus, 
the significant increase in the extent of voluntary 
disclosures in the annual reports by Malaysian listed 
firms could be considered as the managerial 
disclosure decision to enhance firms‟ credibility 
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with stakeholders and thereby, reducing information 
asymmetry.  
In terms of practical implication, the extent of 
voluntary disclosure as documented in this study 
should send a signal to Malaysian regulators to 
strengthen its regulatory framework in encouraging 
listed firms to disclose information on voluntary 
basis. In an increasingly volatile and interdependent 
global economy, both regulators and policy makers 
play important roles in advocating voluntary 
disclosures which may demonstrate the potential 
value of sustainability reporting as a management 
and investors relations tool. Another important 
practical implication arises from the study is the 
involvement of large shareholders in the ownership 
structure who can serve as good monitors in 
corporate disclosure decision-making process. Given 
a relatively similar corporate governance 
environment, the findings may be of interest to 
policy makers and regulators in East Asian 
countries. 
This study has its limitations. Although it is not 
the intention of the study to establish the causality 
between the corporate governance and ownership 
structure and voluntary disclosure, the endogeneity 
issue may be further and deeper investigated by 
undertaken different methodologies. More 
governance variables could be incorporated in 
creating a composite proxy measure - corporate 
governance score. The dimension of the sample 
could be increased by analysing more listed firms. 
Also, the disclosure index can be object of criticism, 
as the dichotomous measurement can only ascertain 
the existence of items disclosed and not the 
informativeness of the disclosed items. Finally, the 
background and culture of top management team 
may affect the disclosure policies emanating from 
the board are excluded from the study. Future 
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